在政府主导的生态建设工程中,各利益主体决策行为相互影响,策略相互依存。使用博弈论方法研究生态建设工程中利益主体间相互作用关系及结果是一条可行途径。以典型的生态建设工程——退耕还林还草工程为例,分别从静态和动态两方面,建立退耕还林还草博弈模型。模型表明:在中央政府参与的三方动态博弈中,中央政府应当在发展水平较低、生态环境脆弱地区安排下达较多的任务量,同时为保证项目工程顺利实施,应提高该地区的补助比例;在没有中央政府的监督考核机制、群众完成项目量不影响地方政府外部效应情况下,地方政府就会忽视群众利益;农牧民作为项目具体执行者,主要从政府补助比例、工程任务量及自身实际情况出发,考虑完成任务比例,而极少关注政府"信誉"问题。因此,在推进生态建设工程中,项目决策管理层应认识到地区间差异,实行有区别的项目政策,中央政府应在工程中起主导作用。
All interest subjects interact each other in the government-led ecological construction projects, and theirs strategies interdepend on each other too. It is feasible that using the game theory to study the interaction relation between different interest subjects in ecological construction projects. Turning Cultivated Land Back Into Forests and Grasslands Project, which is a typical ecological construction project, is taken as a study case to establish game model. Then the model is researched from two aspects of static and dynamic, respectively. The results show that the central government should arrange more project tasks at the regions of lower development level and fragile ecological environment. Meanwhile, for ensuring the smooth implementation of the project, the proportion of subsidy given by the central government to this region should be raised; If there are no the mechanism of supervision and assessment made by the central government, and the project amount which farmers and herdsmen finished have no effect on the external effect of local government, the local government may ignore the benefit of farmers and herdsmen. As project specific performer, farmers and herdsmen mainly focus on the proportion of subsidy given by government and the project amount, then make decision to finish specific percentage of the tasks amount, but pay little attention to the problem of government's "credibility". Therefore, the project decision-maker should consider the region differences and implement different policy items in the process of implementation of the project. Furthermore, the central government should play a leading role in the project.
[1] 彭珂珊,吉娟玲,徐学选.试论生态修复与退耕还林还草工程[J].科技导报,2004(12):23-26.
[2] Hamdar B.An efficiency approach to managing Mississippi's marginal land based on the conservation reserve program(CRP)[J].Resources,Conservation and Recycling,1999,26:15-24.
[3] Arnalds O,Barkarson B H.Soil erosion and land use policy in Iceland in relation to sheep grazing and government subsidies[J].Environmental Science & Policy,2003,6:105-113.
[4] 曹广民,龙瑞军.三江源区"黑土滩"型退化草地自然恢复的瓶颈及解决途径[J].草地学报,2009,17(1):4-9.
[5] 黄富祥,康慕谊,张新时.退耕还林还草过程中的经济补偿问题探讨[J].生态学报,2002,22(4):471-478.
[6] 邵景安,邵全琴,芦清水,等.农牧民参与政府主导生态建设工程的初始行为响应——以江西山江湖和青海三江源为例[J].自然资源学报,2012,27(7):1075-1088.
[7] 刘兴元,尚占环,龙瑞军.草地生态补偿机制与补偿方案探讨[J].草地学报,2010,18(1):126-131.
[8] 朱丹.黄土高原地区退耕还林还草模式及可持续发展研究[D].兰州:兰州大学,2008.
[9] 马海芸,雍雅明,刘宗盛.干早半干旱区退耕还林还草工程效益综合评价——以榆中县为例[J].草业科学,2012,29(9):1359-1367.
[10] 樊胜岳,徐裕财,徐均,等.生态建设政策对沙漠化影响的定量分析[J].中国沙漠,2014,34(3):893-900.
[11] 路慧玲,周立华,陈勇,等.基于农户视角的盐池县退牧还草政策可持续性分析[J].中国沙漠,2015,35(4):1065-1071.
[12] 张丽琼,赵雪雁,郭芳,等.石羊河下游农户的土地利用行为及效率[J].中国沙漠,2015,35(6):1715-1722.
[13] 古丽努尔·沙布尔哈孜,尹林克,热合木都拉·阿地拉,等.塔里木河中下游退耕还林还草综合生态效益评价——以新疆生产建设兵团农二师33团为例[J].干旱区研究,2004,21(2):161-165.
[14] 杜英,杨改河,刘志超.黄土丘陵沟壑区退耕还林还草工程生态服务价值评估——以安塞县为例[J].西北农林科技大学学报:自然科学版,2008,36(6):131-140.
[15] 杨明洪.退耕还林还草工程实施中经济利益补偿的博弈分析[J].云南社会科学,2004(6):64-68.
[16] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004:6-18.