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中国沙漠 ›› 2016, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (3): 836-841.DOI: 10.7522/j.issn.1000-694X.2015.00068

• 生态与经济 • 上一篇    下一篇

生态建设工程中利益主体间的博弈模型——以政府主导的退耕还林还草工程为例

魏建洲, 刘彦平, 张锋, 金俊栋   

  1. 甘肃农业大学 理学院 数量生物研究中心, 甘肃 兰州 730070
  • 收稿日期:2015-01-19 修回日期:2015-03-24 出版日期:2016-05-20 发布日期:2016-05-20
  • 作者简介:魏建洲(1983-),男,甘肃天水人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为农业生态学和博弈论。E-mail:weijz@gsau.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(31360104);甘肃农业大学盛彤笙科技创新基金项目(GSAU-STS-1326)

Game Model of Interest Subject in Ecological Construction Projects: a Case Study of Government-led Turning Cultivated Land Back Into Forests and Grasslands Project

Wei Jianzhou, Liu Yanping, Zhang Feng, Jin Jundong   

  1. Center for Quantitative Biology, College of Science, Gansu Agricultural University, Lanzhou 730070, China
  • Received:2015-01-19 Revised:2015-03-24 Online:2016-05-20 Published:2016-05-20

摘要: 在政府主导的生态建设工程中,各利益主体决策行为相互影响,策略相互依存。使用博弈论方法研究生态建设工程中利益主体间相互作用关系及结果是一条可行途径。以典型的生态建设工程——退耕还林还草工程为例,分别从静态和动态两方面,建立退耕还林还草博弈模型。模型表明:在中央政府参与的三方动态博弈中,中央政府应当在发展水平较低、生态环境脆弱地区安排下达较多的任务量,同时为保证项目工程顺利实施,应提高该地区的补助比例;在没有中央政府的监督考核机制、群众完成项目量不影响地方政府外部效应情况下,地方政府就会忽视群众利益;农牧民作为项目具体执行者,主要从政府补助比例、工程任务量及自身实际情况出发,考虑完成任务比例,而极少关注政府"信誉"问题。因此,在推进生态建设工程中,项目决策管理层应认识到地区间差异,实行有区别的项目政策,中央政府应在工程中起主导作用。

关键词: 生态建设, 博弈模型, 纳什均衡, 政府, 农牧民

Abstract: All interest subjects interact each other in the government-led ecological construction projects, and theirs strategies interdepend on each other too. It is feasible that using the game theory to study the interaction relation between different interest subjects in ecological construction projects. Turning Cultivated Land Back Into Forests and Grasslands Project, which is a typical ecological construction project, is taken as a study case to establish game model. Then the model is researched from two aspects of static and dynamic, respectively. The results show that the central government should arrange more project tasks at the regions of lower development level and fragile ecological environment. Meanwhile, for ensuring the smooth implementation of the project, the proportion of subsidy given by the central government to this region should be raised; If there are no the mechanism of supervision and assessment made by the central government, and the project amount which farmers and herdsmen finished have no effect on the external effect of local government, the local government may ignore the benefit of farmers and herdsmen. As project specific performer, farmers and herdsmen mainly focus on the proportion of subsidy given by government and the project amount, then make decision to finish specific percentage of the tasks amount, but pay little attention to the problem of government's "credibility". Therefore, the project decision-maker should consider the region differences and implement different policy items in the process of implementation of the project. Furthermore, the central government should play a leading role in the project.

Key words: ecological construction, game model, Nash equilibrium, government, farmers and herdsmen

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